Examining Trustworthiness in Canadian and Japanese Cultural Context: How to quantify the distance between two groups, each consisting of 3-dimensionally estimated objects? (Maximum Likelihood and Bayesian Methods) by Kanazawa, Yuichiro et al.
Title
Examining Trustworthiness in Canadian and Japanese Cultural
Context: How to quantify the distance between two groups,
each consisting of 3-dimensionally estimated objects?
(Maximum Likelihood and Bayesian Methods)
Author(s)Kanazawa, Yuichiro; Kwantes, Catherine; Watanabe,Shinichiro








Examining Trustworthiness in Canadian and
Japanese Cultural Context: How to quantify the
distance between two groups, each consisting of
3‐dimensionally estimated objects?
Yuichiro Kanazawa, Catherine Kwantes, Shinichiro Watanabe
International Christian University, University of Windsor, University of Tsukuba
1 Introduction
Quantifying trustfulness goes back to Rotter (1967) ([Rotter, 1967]) in
which a new type of likert‐like scale for the measurement of interpersonal
trust was developed and refined on the basis of item analysis. Here in‐
terpersonal trust was defined to be the generalized expectancy that the
verbal statements of others can be relied upon. Trustfulness has been ac‐
tively investigated by many researchers for a long time in a different context
and using questionnaire surveys and/or experiments. We first review this
development.
Trustfulness through questionnaire survey
By carefully separating the concept of trust from the concept of assur‐
ance, Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) ([Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994])
tried to explain a puzzle of cross‐national differences between the United
States and Japan in the levels of trustfulness through a cross‐national
questionnaire survey that challenges the prevailing wisdom at the time.
Through a US‐Japan comparative questionnaire survey, Yamagishi and
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Komiyama (1995) ([Yamagishi and Komiyama, 1995]) tested a series of
predictions involving US‐Japan contrasts derived from Yamagishi^{1}s the‐
ory of trust that emphasizes the role trust plays in “emancipating”people
from commitment relation. They found that Americans are higher in gen‐
eral trust, Japanese have higher expectations of benefit from maintaining
relations with specific others, Americans consider information role of repu‐
tation more important, and Americans consider honesty and fairness more
important.
Trustfulness through experiments
Knowledge on many aspects of trustfulness has been accumulated over
the years through carefully designed experiments as well. It started out
as an investigation into somewhat different but related topic of cooper‐
ation measured by the contribution to a public good, members of
five‐person groups decided whether they would contribute their resource
money to the provision of a public good when expectation of other mem‐
bers’ cooperativeness was manipulated in an experiment in Sato and Ya‐
magishi ([Sato and Yamagishi, 1986]). They found, for instance, trust in
other members and the motivation of free‐riding had more effects upon
subjects? cooperation when subjects believe that other members’ cost for
cooperation (the amount of resource money they were required to con‐
tribute) was high. Yamagishi and Sato ([Yamagishi and Sato, 1986]) ex‐
perimentally investigated two motivational bases for not contributing to a
public good‐desire to “free ride” (or greed) and fear of being a “sucker.”
They found fear would have a strong effect but greed would not when a
public good is produced conjunctively, that is, by individuals working in
union and every member‘  s contribution is essential. Also the greater mu‐
tual trust existing among friends would make them contribute more than
strangers would in this conjunctive condition. On the other hand, they
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found greed would have a strong effect but fear would not when a public
good is produced disjunctively or by one or a few member’  s cooperative
action.
On the validity and raison d?etre of a prisoner’s dilemma (hence‐
forth PD) game and its variants in differentiating trust, assur‐
ance, and cooperation, Hayashi et al. (1999) ([Hayashi et al., 1999]),
arguing that many participants treat a  prisoner^{1}s dilemma game as an as‐
surance game and respond in a reciprocal manner to the choice or expected
choice of their partner, examined two  bases-general trust and a sense of
 control-for the expectation of a  partner^{1}s cooperation in one‐shot  prisoner^{1}s
dilemma games and why they expect general trust and a sense of control
to play different roles in different societies. They found that a sense of
control plays a relatively more important role as a foundation for expec‐
tations in Japanese society and general trust plays the more important
role in American society.Yamagishi et al. (2005) ([Yamagishi et al., 2005])
summarized the major findings discovered by experimental studies using
a  prisoner^{1}s dilemma games with choice of dependence (henceforth  PD/D)
that have been published previously only in Japanese and discussed some
of their implications. They define trustfulness, or an act of trustfulness,
as an act that voluntarily exposes oneself to greater positive and negative
externalities by the actions of the other  (s) , while cooperation as an act that
increases the welfare of the other(s) at some opportunity cost where the
former is greater than the latter.  PD/D allows each player separately to
choose the level of trust she wants to place in the other player, and the
behavioral choice to cooperate or defect with the other. That is, it allows
the players to make separate decisions to trust and to cooperate, and thus
allows the researchers to study the two processes separately. In  PD/D,
it is possible for players to choose to cooperate with the others without
trusting them. They found that it is cooperation which leads to trust, not
the other way around and demonstrated that separating trust from cooper‐
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ation is critical for building trust relations. Matsuda and Yamagishi (2001)
([Matsuda and Yamagishi, 2001]) examined the relationship between coop‐
eration and trust in interpersonal trust formation through a  PD/D and re‐
vealed a more nuanced result obtained through a simple iterated  prisoner^{1}s
dilemma games. That is, participants in the  PD/D adopted “cautious and
unconditional cooperation strategy”rather than tit‐for‐tat strategy. Terai
et al. (2003) ([Terai et al., 2003]) conducted two experiments using the
 PD/D and found that the cooperation rate was extremely high (95.1%)
while the game was being repeated, but only half of the subjects coop‐
erated in the final game, suggesting ‘ shadow of the future ” (Axelrod,
1984) ([Axelrod, 1984]) in play in forming cooperation. Nonetheless, most
subjects trusted a partner who had behaved cooperatively toward them
in the repeated games (i.e. under an incentive structure that encouraged
such behavior), even in the final game, in which such an incentive basis
was absent, indicating that the subjects failed to distinguish the two bases
of expecting benign behavior from interaction partners‐trust based on the
inferred personal traits of the partner and assurance of cooperation based
on the nature of the incentive structure.
On the conditions under which trust is being formed, Yamagishi
and Komiyama (1995) ([Yamagishi and Komiyama, 1995]) through a series
of laboratory experiments successfully confirmed: the most standard so‐
lution to problems caused by social uncertainty is commitment formation,
i.e., formation of stable and durable relations with reliable partners; high
trusters (those who have a high level of trust in people in general) would
be easier to leave a commitment relation that had been formed in order
to reduce social uncertainty. Yamagishi et al. ([Yamagishi et al., 1995])
distinguishing two kinds of  trust-general and particularistic trust, and
in an experiment simulating buyer‐seller relations, found support for the
following: social uncertainty promoted commitment formation; commit‐
ment formation promoted one  partner^{1}s trust in the other (which they
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called particularistic trust); as a result of the above two effects, social un‐
certainty promoted the general level of particularistic trust in a group;
general trust, which was defined as a general belief in human benevo‐
lence, suppressed commitment formation. Kakiuchi and Yamagishi (1997)
([Kakiuchi and Yamagishi, 1997]) examined the development of trusting
relationships as investments in relation‐specific assets through a new ex‐
perimental game called “the dilemma of variable interdependency”based
on iterated  prisoner^{1}s dilemma game. This game will be called later as a
 prisoner^{1}s dilemma games with choice of dependence  (PD/D) as mentioned
in Yamagishi et al. (2005) ([Yamagishi et al., 2005]). It was invented inde‐
pendently of Van Lange and Visser (1999) ([Van Lange and Visser, 1999])
and was first published in Kakiuchi and Yamagishi (1997) a couple of
years before theirs. Mashima et al. (2004) ([Mashima et al.,  2004b] ) exam‐
ined the role of trust in relationships between temporary partners through
 PD/D and PD and found that trust serves as a signal of the  player^{1}s in‐
tention, which in turn promotes mutual cooperation. Cook et al. (2005)
([Cook et al., 2005]) arguing that a series of risk‐taking behaviors is indis‐
pensable to building a trust relation, conducted experiments in Japan and
the United States to examine the independent and cross‐cultural effects of
risk taking on trust building. The results of these experiments indicate that
the American participants took more risks than did the Japanese, support‐
ing the general claim that Americans are inclined toward risk taking and
trust building. Kiyonari et al. (2006) ([Kiyonari et al., 2006]) provided
an answer to whether trusting begets trustworthiness. In two experimen‐
tal games with Japanese and American participants, respectively in Trust
and Faith Games and found that trust does not beget trustworthiness, at
least in one‐shot games. Yamagishi et al. (2015) ([Yamagishi et al., 2015]),
tackling the problem that attitudinal measures of general trust often fail to
predict actual trusting behavior in laboratory testing, proposed that mea‐
sures of attitudinal trust is more successful in predicting behavioral trust
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when they tap both the  responder^{1}s belief that  his/her trust will be hon‐
ored and  his/her preference to be a trusting person. They demonstrated
that the newly constructed measure including these two  responder^{1}s belief
better predicted behavioral trust in a trust game.
On the characteristics and contrasts of high and low trusters,
Kikuchi et al. ([Kikuchi et al., 1997]) tested and supported a hypothesis
that subjects who are more trusting of others in general (high‐trusters)
are more accurate than low‐trusters in judging trustworthiness of others
as Rotter (1980) ([Rotter, 1980]) claims through an experiment, indicat‐
ing high‐trusters are shown to be prudent people who pay careful atten‐
tion to information potentially revealing  other^{1}s lack of trustworthiness.
Yamagishi et al. ([Yamagishi et al., 1998]) tested and confirmed the pre‐
diction that social uncertainty promotes commitment formation between
particular partners and high trusters tend to form committed relations
less frequently than would low trusters when facing social uncertainty
through two experiments conducted in the United States and Japan. Ko‐
sugi and Yamagishi (1998) ([Kosugi and Yamagishi, 1998]) demonstrated
that trustful people are more sensitive to information that indicates lack
of trustworthiness in other people through two experiments. Yamagishi et
al. ([Yamagishi et al., 1999]) conducted a series of experiments in Japan
showing that high trusters (as measured with a general trust scale) are
more sensitive than low trusters to information potentially revealing lack
of trustworthiness in others and judge other  people^{1}s choice in a one‐shot
 prisoner^{1}s dilemma more accurately.
On ingroup versus outgroup trust formation, Mashima et al. (2004)
([Mashima et al.,  2004a] ) in a  PD/D experiment participated by Ameri‐
can and Japanese students, found no evidence of ingroup bias in terms
of trust and cooperation. However they found that American partic‐
ipants were more sensitive than Japanese counterparts, to information
regarding the past trust behavior of other players when they were de‐
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ciding whom they trust and whether or not they reciprocate  another^{1}s
trust. Suzuki et al. (2007) ([Suzuki et al., 2007]) tested that expecta‐
tions of generalized reciprocity within  one^{1}s own group are responsible for
in‐group trust through an allocator choice game in the minimal group
situation. Participants’ in‐group trust is derived from the general be‐
lief that people treat in‐group members more favorably than out‐group
members—a belief about generalized reciprocity within groups. Kiyonari
et al. (2007) ([Kiyonari et al., 2007]) conducted experiments called Trust
and Faith games. In both Trust and Faith Games, one person plays a role
of the distributor of 2,  500JPY and the other person plays a role of the
receiver with two choices, receiving 1,  000JPY for certainty, or receiving
whatever the amount the distributor decides. In the Trust game, both
the distributor and the receiver make the decision simultaneously and the
distributor does not have the information on  receiver^{1}s decision, while in
the Faith game, the distributor makes the decision after learning  receiver^{1}s
decision. In other words, in Faith game, the receiver can expect rewarding
and possibly mutually beneficial behavior on the part of the distributor for
 his/her decision. They tested and confirmed that a prediction that peo‐
ple show stronger trust of in‐group members than of out‐group members
in the Faith game but not in the Trust game. In Foddy et al. (2009)
([Foddy et al., 2009]), when offered participants a choice between an un‐
known monetary allocation made by an in‐group (university or major) or an
out‐group allocator, both of whom had total control over the distribution
of an identical sum of money, participants strongly preferred the in‐group
allocator. This preference occurred regardless of whether the stereotype
of the in‐group was relatively more positive or more negative than that
of the out‐group. However, this preference did not persist when partici‐
pants believed that the allocator was unaware of their group membership.
Platow et al. (2012) ([Platow et al., 2012]) evaluated the role that com‐
mon knowledge of a shared social group membership between self and a
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to‐be‐trusted stranger provides as a basis for trusting this stranger in two
experiments. This common knowledge emerges when the truster knows the
group membership of the to‐be‐trusted other, and believes that this other
also knows the group membership of the truster. They show that people are
more likely to trust an in‐group member over an out‐group member under
conditions of common group‐membership knowledge rather than private
group‐membership knowledge (i.e. other does not know  truster^{1}s group).
Yuki et al. (2005) ([Yuki et al., 2005]), on cross‐cultural trust and
cooperation, explored differences in depersonalized trust (trust toward
a relatively unknown target person) across cultures. Based on a theoreti‐
cal framework that postulates predominantly different bases for group be‐
haviors in Western cultures versus Eastern cultures, it was predicted and
supported by two experiments that Americans would tend to trust peo‐
ple primarily based on whether they shared category memberships, while
Japanese was expected to be based on the likelihood of sharing direct or in‐
direct interpersonal links. Kuwabara et al. (2007) ([Kuwabara et al., 2007])
conducted a variation of the Trust game in two different experimental con‐
ditions:  a “flags‐on”condition in which  everyone^{1}s nationality was publicly
identified during the session, and a “flags‐off”condition in which partic‐
ipants did not know who was Japanese or American using a Web‐based
“virtual lab” to study trust and trustworthiness between Japanese and
Americans in real‐time interaction. They found a support for Yamagishi ’
 s structural theory of trust, in that Japanese will form more durable ex‐
change relations compared to Americans. However, they found less support
for explanations that focus on cultural differences in trust and trustwor‐
thiness, and for cognitive explanations that point to the effects of a shared
social identity between participants and partners with common nationality.
University students from Japan, China, and Taiwan participated in exper‐
iments involving participants from their own society and another society
in real time using an intercultural trust paradigm derived from a game
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theoretic and evolutionary approach to social exchange in Takahashi et al.
(2008) ([Takahashi et al., 2008]). They found that Japanese collectivism is
based more on long‐term assurance networks, whereas Chinese collectivism
provides a more expansive, guanxi‐based approach to building new social
networks. Japanese also showed less in‐group favoritism in both trust and
trustworthiness (or conditional fairness) at the national‐level compared to
cultural Chinese. Liu et al. (2011) ([Liu et al., 2011]), using a dyadic game
theory paradigm, conducted three experiments—China vs Japan, China vs
Taiwan, Taiwan vs Japan—on the social dilemma of trust over the Inter‐
net in real time, involving real money. It was predicted and found that
ingroup favoritism in trusting behavior was contingent on historical re‐
lationships between societies. They found Japanese were unique in not
displaying ingroup favoring behavior at all, whereas both Chinese and Tai‐
wanese were context specific in their in‐ group favoritism. In Yamagishi
(2011) ([Yamagishi, 2011]), he wrote that collectivist societies produce se‐
curity, but destroy trust: In collectivist societies, people are connected
through networks of strong personal ties where the behavior of all agents
is constantly monitored and controlled; As a result, individuals in collec‐
tivist networks are assured that others will abide by social norms, and gain
a sense of security erroneously thought of as “trust;”However, this book
argues that this security is not truly trust, based on beliefs regarding the
integrity of others, but assurance, based on the system of mutual control
within the network. When the political tide in many countries has shifted
inward, with skepticism and reluctance to cooperate with other countries,
Romano et al. (2017) ([Romano et al., 2017]) conducted an experimental
study in 17 countries designed to test several theories that explain why,
who, and where people trust and cooperate more with ingroup members,
compared with outgroup members. In addition to the standard finding that
participants trust and cooperate more with ingroup than outgroup mem‐
bers, they obtained findings that reputational concerns play a decisive role
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for promoting trust and cooperation universally across societies.
Trustworthiness
Perhaps because trustfulness have been investigated so extensively as
described above, it is natural to focus on the receiving end of that trustful‐
ness. We observe upsurge of interest in the constructs of trustworthiness
in the social science research literature recently. Along with it, a recog‐
nition of the importance of developing more contextual understandings of
these constructs ([Li, 2007]; [Doney et al., 1998]) has emerged, with some
theorists explicitly asserting that trust always depends on context (e.g.
[Hardin, 2002]). For that end, we formed in April 2018 the Trustworthiness
Research Alliance at https://www.trustworthiness. ca/index.htm, an
international and multidisciplinary group of researchers who investigate
trustworthiness and the role that perceptions of the trustworthiness of in‐
dividuals, organizations, and institutions plays in decisions to take the leap
of faith we know of as “trust.”
Societal culture has been identified as one important contextual factor
in determining expectations of trustworthiness as “simply put, culture is a
shared agreement (usually implicit) about how to approach the world and
each  othe7^{f} ’ ([Whitener et al., 2000], p.4). We already described how soci‐
etal culture may matter to trustfulness above, the same can be said for
trustworthiness. What remains lacking, however, is an explicit, empirical
examination of the context within which decisions related to trust are made
and direct empirical assessments of trustworthiness. This research explic‐
itly examines the bases for determining trustworthiness in the Canadian




While related, the two constructs of trustfulness and trustworthiness are
distinctly different. Trustfulness, an abstract construct, is a willingness to
place ones’ self in a vulnerable position to another([Saunders et al., 2014]);
Trustworthiness comprises an assessment of another’s likelihood of honor‐
ing that vulnerability. Implicit in the willingness to trust is an appraisal of
whether or not another individual is worthy of that trust.
This calculation is based on a number of assessments, such as a deter‐
mination of the extent to which the other party is able to, willing to and
responsible enough to be trusted. [Mayer et al., 1995] cite three important
characteristics of a potential trustee — the ABI framework.
Ability A degree of trustee competence in the realm in which trust will be
extended.
Benevolence An assumption that the potential trustee has the potential
trustor’s best interests at heart.
Integrity A perception that the potential trustee is a person who upholds
moral standards that are deemed appropriate by the potential trustor.
Trustworthiness, as an assessment of the extent to which one is willing to
be vulnerable, focuses on the other party and implicitly suggests that some
current or future interaction will occur between the trustor and the trustee.
Being willing to trust another implicitly reflects social decision making and
incorporates a social exchange ideology ([van’t Wout and Sanfey, 2008]).
While each party to a social exchange brings expectations based on that
 individua1^{1}s personality (e.g. level of dependence versus independence), ex‐
pectations are also based on examples of role exchanges that the individual
has been exposed to (e.g. relationships within a specific societal culture).
Social exchanges do not, however, occur in a vacuum—each party to a
social exchange brings expectations that are based on personality as well
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as expectations that are based on examples of role exchanges that an in‐
dividual has been exposed to. These expectations are based, at least in
part, on the context that these decisions are made within ([Hardin, 2002];
[Li, 2012]). It has been argued that all situational contexts within which
people operate are given meaning by culture ([Matsumoto, 2007]). Societal
culture has a profound impact in individuals, as individuals are socialized
early on to internalize a culture’s values and norms of behavior. Culture
therefore functions as a critical context for interactions, as individual behav‐
ior is shaped by what that person has learned is rewarded or punished within
that cultural context ([Bond and Smith, 2018]), and has a fundamental role
in shaping how trust develops.
As Markus and Kitayama (1991) ([Markus and Kitayama, 1991]) sug‐
gested for culture and the self, we are interested in observing, for instance,
“on average, relatively more individuals in Canadian culture will hold the
integrity to be the dominant components in the ABI framework than will
individuals in Japanese culture. Within a given culture, however, we are
ready to accept that individuals will vary in the extent to which they are
good cultural representatives and consider trustworthiness in the mandated
way
2 Data
Undergraduate students  (n=238) at a university in Ontario, Canada
and similarly undergraduate students  (n=237) at a university in Ibaraki,
Japan, were recruited for this study. Of those, two from Canadian sample
and three from Japanese sample were listwisely‐deleted because of their
extensive missing values. Therefore our sample consist of 236 Canadian
and 234 Japanese undergraduate students. Although students generally
have limited organizational experience, their perception of social culture
on trustworthiness is within their realm of experience and were considered
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an appropriate population for the study.
Participants were asked to describe a trustworthy person, friend, family
member, colleague, and supervisor by responding and writing down in their
own words to statements such as “A trustworthy person (friend, family
member, colleague, or supervisor) is someone who is or does—
For Japanese sample, the original English questionnaire items were trans‐
lated into Japanese and another independently back‐translate the Japanese‐
translation of the original items back into English to evaluate the quality of
the items translated into Japanese. The Japanese participants were asked
to respond and write down in Japanese to statements such as above. One
professional experienced in the field then translate the responses into En‐
glish, and another independently back‐translate the English‐translation of
the original responses back into Japanese to compare the validity of English
translation of the original responses in Japanese.
Participants’ responses, all in English, were then coded in Canada by two
raters independently, and then reconciled to reflect the extent to which the
response reflected the attribute of Ability (A), Benevolence (B), Integrity
(I) or something else. This last category was added to the ABI framework,
expanding it to include “Other (O) and thus responses were coded accord‐
ing to an “ABIO” framework. These ratings ranged from  0” (the attribute
is not present in the response) to 5” (the attribute is emphasized in the
response). The ratings for 1” (the attribute is slightly present in the re‐
sponse) and 2” (the attribute is somewhat present in the response) were
very small, suggesting that there was no meaningful difference between
those ratings, and therefore these categories were collapsed, and the final
possible ratings were  0,1,2,3 , and 4. Thus, for each role—trustworthy
person, friend, family member, colleague, and supervisor, there was a dis‐
tribution of the relative importance of ability, benevolence, integrity, and
other attributes in the response.
A distribution of 0440 (ABIO) reflects the same distribution as 0220
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(ABIO) since in both cases  B and I are rated as equally important, and
A and  O are absent. These patterns will be turned into proportionate
responses (or probability) so that the total probability of ABI&O adds up
to 1.”  An ABIO pattern of 0440 would become  (0,0.5,0.5,0) and the ABIO
pattern of 0220 would also become  (0,0.5,0.5,0) . Similarly, a pattern of
0140 would become  (0,0.2,0.8,0) .
We present two 3‐dimensional (Ability, Benevolence, Integrity) scatter‐
plots, one for Canadian and the other for Japanese sample with additional
data dimension “Other”represented by a colored vertical bar to the right
in Figures 1 and 2.
Since there are overwhelming number of points clustered at the  (A, B, I, O)
 =(0,0,1,0) location and to a lesser degree at the  (A, B, I, O)=(0,0,0,1)
location in the 3‐dimensional plot, we “jittered”or added a small amount of
noise, to all the data to break ties. We immediately notice that both Cana‐
dian and Japanese sample has a many  (0,0,1,0) for ABIO pattern. There
are 137 Canadian respondents in dark blue clustered around  (A, B, I, O)
 =(0,0,1,0) in Figure 1, while there are almost as many (125) Japanese
respondents (in dark blue) with the same response pattern in Figure 2.
On the other hand, there are many more Japanese samples with  (A, B, I, O)
 =(0,0,0,1) than Canadian samples: there are 33 Japanese respondents
in dark brown clustered around  (A, B, I, O)=(0,0,0,1) , while there are
only 5 Canadian respondents (in dark brown) with the same response pat‐
tern. This group is potentially troublesome because the ABI framework
may not hold for respondents belonging to this subgroup and applicabil‐
ity/universality of the ABI framework is in doubt at least for this subgroup.
3 Methods
Note that for each respondents, we originally record the extent to which
the response reflected the attribute of Ability (A), Benevolence (B), In‐
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Figure 1: Four dimensional “jittered”scatterplot of (Ability, Benevolence, Integrity) for
trustworthy person in Canadian sample with “Other”represented by a colored vertical bar
to the right.
OtherTrustworthy Person (Canadian Sample) (in probability)
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Figure 2: Four dimensional ‘jittered”scatterplot of (Ability, Benevolence, Integrity) for
Trustworthy Person in Japanese sample with “Other”represented by a colored vertical
bar to the right.
OtherTrustworthy Person (Japanese Sample) (in probability)
.0
.8
 0.8\circ_{\circ}\circ 0\circ\circ 0^{o_{O}} 6
 (\overline{\underline{\frac{\supset}{\circ(D\neg}}.}\mathfrak{c}  ) © 0  0
 \iota\overline{<}c
 \circ  \circ\theta\circ^{\circ\circ} 4
 \theta_{2arrow\supset\circ}^{\circ}\circ\circ
 0
 \circ \backslash \backslash 1.0 2 \circ
 \backslash 0.8
0.2
0.4 /  \backslash 0.6





tegrity (I) or something else (O) by ratings of  0,1,2,3 , and 4, then we
convert them into four category proportionate responses (or probability)
so that the total probability of ABI&O adds up to 1. In other words, our
data are quantitative descriptions of the parts of some whole, conveying
relative information, or all relevant information in this type of data is con‐
tained in ratios between components. This type of data are thus called
“compositional data
Compositional Data
The use of standard statistical methods for the analysis of compositional
data that use the usual Euclidean geometry is not coherent. Rather, com‐
positional data follow the so‐called Aitchison geometry on the simplex.
A compositional data point (or composition for short)  x=(x_{1}, x_{2}, \ldots, x_{D})
with  D component can be represented by a positive real vector. The sample
space of compositional data is a  D‐part simplex:
 S^{D}= \{x=(x_{1}, x_{2}, \ldots, x_{D})\in \mathbb{R}^{D} x_{i}>0, i=1,2, . . 
. , D;\sum_{i=1}^{D}x_{i}=\kappa\},
where  \kappa is a prescribed sum constraint. In other words, sample space of a
composition consists of the set of all complete rays from the origin, such
that the parts are strictly positive.
According to Egozcue (2009) [Egozcue, 2009], compositional data analy‐
sis should respect the following principles:
scale invariance The information in a composition does not depend on
the particular units in which the composition is expressed;
permutation invariance Permutation of parts of a composition does
not alter the information conveyed by the compositional vector;
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subcompositional coherence Information conveyed by a composition of
 D parts should not be in contradiction with that coming from a sub‐
composition containing  d parts,  d<D.
In Aithison geometry, in order to maintain such desirable properties as
scale invariance, permutation invariance, and subcompositional coherence,
the so‐called “Aitchison distance”  d_{A}(x, y) between  D‐component compo‐
sition  x=(x_{1}, x_{2}, \ldots, x_{D}) and  y=(y_{1}, y_{2}, \ldots, y_{D}) is defined as
 d_{A}(x, y)=\sqrt{\frac{1}{2D}\sum_{i--1}^{D}\sum_{j=1}^{D}(\ln\frac{x_{i}}
{x_{j}}-\ln\frac{y_{i}}{y_{j}})^{2}} , (1)
which supports the concept of relative scale. If one compares the Aitchison
distance in (1) with the usual Euclidean distance  d_{E}(x, y) of
 d_{E}(x, y)=\sqrt{\sum_{i--1}^{D}(x_{i}-y_{i})^{2}} , (2)
one immediately notices the difficulty of defining the Aitchison distance
when at least one of  x_{i} or  y_{i} is zero, because  \ln(0)=-\infty . This is why
the sample space of a composition consists of the set of all strictly positive
complete rays from the origin.
Structural or essential zero in compositional data analysis
According to the nature of values, rounded or structural/essential zeros
need to be considered. Rounded zeros occur when either small values of
components are rounded zeros, or a measurement device has incorporated
a detection limit or a threshold value that automatically sets values below
this limit/threshold to zero. Therefore, their replacement by a small pos‐
itive value is reasonable. For rounded zeros, model‐based algorithms have
been developed and are available in such statistical package as  R.
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However, structural or essential zero are result of a structural process,
and thus imputing them does not make sense. Aitchison and Kay (2003)
[Aitchison and Kay, 2003] points out:
By an essential zero we mean a component which is truly zero,
not something recorded as zero simply because the experimental
design or the measuring instrument has not been sufficiently sen‐
sitive to detect a trace of the part. Such essential zeros occur in
many compositional situations. In household budget patterns,
where some households may spend nothing on such commodity
groups as tobacco, alcohol, entertainment, over the period of ob‐
servation.
Structural or essential zeros cannot be analyzed directly within the well‐
established logratio methodology for compositional data. One approach
discussed in Aitchison and Kay (2003) [Aitchison and Kay, 2003] is “to
interpret structural or essential zeros in a certain part as indicators of
two different subgroups: one group containing observations with a value
of zero in a certain part as indicators of two different subgroups. This
implicitly assumes that the observations originate from two populations,
with and without zero in the specific component, with possibly different
distributions of the non‐zero parts (Filzmoser, Hron and Templ, 2018,
p.266)” [Filzmoser et al., 2018]. If this is indeed the case, both groups of
observations can be analyzed separately. Such an approach makes sense
only when there are a very simply zero structures, however. When the
zero structure is more complex, one would have to split the data set into
many number of subgroups for all possible patterns of zeros in the data.
Consequently, there will be insufficient sample size for analyzing any one
of such a subgroup. From Figures 1 and 2, it is obvious that we are facing





Before the logratio methodology was introduced, a standard approach
for modeling compositional data was based on the Dirichlet distribution.
The Dirichlet distribution is a probability distribution as well—but it is
not sampling from the space of real numbers. Instead it is sampling over a
probability simplex. A probability simplex is a bunch of numbers that add
up to 1. For example: (0.65, 0.35), (0.05, 0.25, 0.7), (0.05, 0.2, 0.1, 0.15,
0.35, 0.15). These numbers represent probabilities over  D distinct cate‐
gories. In the examples above,  D is 2, 3, and 6 respectively. When we are
dealing with categorical distributions and we have some uncertainty over
what that distribution is, the simplest way to represent that uncertainty
as a probability distribution is the Dirichlet.
A  D‐dimensional Dirichlet distribution has  D parameters. These param‐
eters can be any positive number. For example, a 4‐dimensional Dirichlet
may look like this: (0.23, 0.06, 0.32, 0.39). The probabilities just happen
to be the mean value of the Dirichlet. So, all samples from it will center
around that simplex.
The Dirichlet distribution of order  D\geq 2 with positive parameters
 \alpha_{1} , . . . ,  \alpha_{K}>0 for  x=(x_{1}, x_{2}, \ldots, x_{D})\in S^{D} has a probability density
function with respect to Lebesgue measure on the Euclidean space  \Re^{D-1}
given by
 f(x_{1},  \ldots, x_{K};\alpha_{1}, \ldots, \alpha_{D})=\frac{1}{B(\alpha)}
\prod_{i=1}^{D}x_{i}^{\alpha_{i}-1}
where  \{x_{k}\}_{k=1}^{k=D} belong to the standard  D-1 simplex, or in other words:
  \sum_{i=1}^{D}x_{i}=1 and  x_{i}\geq 0 for all  i\in[1, D] . The normalizing constant is the
multivariate beta function, which can be expressed in terms of the gamma
function:
  B(\alpha)=\frac{\prod_{i=1}^{D}\Gamma(\alpha_{i})}{\Gamma(\sum_{i=1}^{D}
\alpha_{i})}, \alpha=(\alpha_{1}, \ldots, \alpha_{D}) .
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The Dirichlet distribution has many advantages: its marginal distribu‐
tions are again Dirichlet distributions; widely applied in Bayesian statistics
as prior and posterior; it allows structural or essential zeros in the com‐
position. However, the approach based on the Dirichlet distribution is not
scale invariant. It is also known that this shortcoming cannot be overcome
even by redefining it with respect to the Aitchison geometry.
Mixture models
In a mixture model, each observed data point is assumed to belong to a
cluster. Mixture models are used for understanding the group structure of
a data set and for flexibly estimating the distribution of a population. The
traditional mixture modeling approach to clustering requires the number
of clusters to be specified in advance of analyzing the data. Most statisti‐
cians address them by first fitting several models, with different numbers of
clusters or factors, and then selecting one using model comparison metrics
([Claeskens and Hjort, 2008]).  K‐means clustering is the most commonly
used clustering (or unsupervised machine learning) algorithm for parti‐
tioning a given data set into a set of  k groups (i.e.  k clusters), where  k
represents the number of groups pre‐specified by the analyst. It classifies
objects in multiple groups (i.e., clusters), such that objects within the same
cluster are as similar as possible (i.e., high intra‐class similarity), whereas
objects from different clusters are as dissimilar as possible (i.e., low inter‐
class similarity). The most common method to determine the number of
clusters is to use Elbow Method that plots within‐sum‐of‐squares in  y‐axis
against the number of clusters in  x‐axis and find the optimal number of
clusters as it appears to be the bend in the knee (or elbow) as seen in
Figure 3. We present the result of the optimal 7 clusters by  K‐means in
Figure 4. Conditional on the seven clusters from the Elbow Method cho‐
sen by  K‐means algorithm, Canadian and Japanese respondents form the
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Figure 3: Elbow Method: The plot of within‐sum‐of‐squares against the number of clusters
for trustworthy person in Canadian and Japanese samples combined
Optimal number of clusters
  \frac{\omega}{o}-\omega\sigma\supset\varpi
  \frac{\geqq}{\vdash^{\circ}\vee\varpi}L\infty\vee\subseteq-\supset E
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Table 1: How many Canadian and Japanese subjects fall in the 7 clusters given by
 K‐means
Sample  \backslash Cluster  \# 1  \# 2  \# 3  \# 4  \# 5  \# 6  \# 7 Row Sum
Canada 12 137 6 48 3 5 25 236
Japan 33 125 41 5 2 8 20 234
Column Sum 45 262 47 53 5 45 13 470
following multinomial samples within each cluster as seen Table 1.
Conditional on the seven clusters given by  K‐means algorithm, we re‐
ject the hypothesis that the two multinomial samples, one consisting of
respondents from Canada and the other comprising of respondents from
Japan, come from the same distribution because:  X‐squared  =72.741,
df  =6 ,  p‐value  =1.119e-13.
Bayesian nonparametric clustering
One potential disadvantage of  K‐means clustering is that it requires us to
pre‐specify the number of clusters. Bayesian nonparametric (BNP) models
provide a different approach to this problem ([Hjort et al., 2010]). Rather
than comparing models that vary in complexity, the BNP approach is to
fit a single model that can adapt its complexity to the data. In other words,
BNP models allow the complexity (the number of clusters in our case) to
grow as more data are observed.
For example, consider the problem of clustering data. The Bayesian non‐
parametric approach estimates how many clusters are needed to model the
observed data and allows future data to exhibit previously unseen clusters.
A finite mixture model assumes that there are  K clusters, each associated
with a parameter  \theta_{k} . Each observation  y_{n} is assumed to be generated by
first choosing a cluster  c_{n} according to  Pr\{c_{n}\} and then generating the
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Figure 4: Four dimensional “jittered”scatterplots of (Ability, Benevolence, Integrity) for
trustworthy person in Canadian and Japanese samples combined with “Other”represented
by a colored vertical bar to the right according to the 7 clusters by  K‐means.
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observation from its corresponding observation distribution  Pr\{y_{n}|\theta_{c_{n}}\} pa‐
rameterized by  \theta_{c_{n}}.
Finite mixtures can accommodate many kinds of data by changing the
data generating distribution. In this study, the data—conditional on know‐
ing their cluster assignments—are assumed to be drawn from the Dirichlet
distributions. Bayesian mixture models further contain a prior over the
mixing distribution  Pr(c) , and a prior over the cluster parameters:  \theta\sim G_{0}.
A convenient choice for the distribution on the mixing distribution  Pr(c)
in our case is also a Dirichlet.
BNP clustering addresses this problem by assuming that there is an in‐
finite number of latent clusters, but that a finite number of them is used
to generate the observed data. The BNP approach finesses the problem of
choosing the number of clusters by assuming that it is infinite, while spec‐
ifying the prior over infinite groupings  Pr\{c\} in such a way that it favors
assigning data to a small number of groups.
BNP clustering with Chinese Restaurant process
Our BNP clustering model uses the Chinese restaurant process (CRP)
in an infinite‐capacity mixture model. Each table  k is associated with a
cluster and with a cluster parameter  \theta_{k} , drawn from a prior  G_{0} . Each data
point is a “customer,” who sits at a table  T_{n} and then draws its observed
value from the distribution  Pr(x_{n}|\theta_{T_{n}}) .
The concentration parameter  \alpha^{1} controls the prior expected number of
clusters (i.e., occupied tables)  K+ . In particular, this number grows loga‐
rithmically with the number of customers  N :
 E[K+]=\alpha\log N for  \alpha<N/\log N
When we analyze data with a CRP, we form an approximation of the joint
posterior over all latent variables and parameters. We use this posterior to
  1If\alpha is treated as unknown, one can put a hyperprior over it
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Table 2: How many Canadian and Japanese subjects fall in the 7 clusters given by CRP
mixture BNP clustering with with  \alpha=0.3
 Sample\backslash Cluster  \# 1  \# 2  \# 3  \# 4  \# 5  \# 6  \# 7 Row Sum
Canada 152 25 43 8 6 1 1 236
Japan 131 83 8 4 5 3  0 234
Column Sum 283 108 51 12 11 4 1 470
examine the likely partitioning of the data: This gives us a sense of how
data are grouped, and how many groups the CRP model chose to use.
Conditional on the seven clusters given by Chinese Restaurant process
mixture BNP clustering with  \alpha=0.3 , respondents from Canada and Japan
form the following multinomial samples as seen in Table 2: Conditional
on the seven clusters given by Dirichlet process Mixture BNP, we reject
the hypothesis that the two multinomial samples, one respondents from
Canada and the other from Japan, come from the same distribution be‐
cause:X‐squared  =60.143 , df  =6 ,  p‐value  =4.21e-11 . However, we
are concerned about 108 respondents belonging to cluster #2 in Figure 5
because, as it turns out, this cluster contains 5 Canadian and 33 Japanese
respondents with  (A, B, I, O)=(0,0,0,1) and it seems this cluster is too
broad.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
Employing two clustering methods—K‐means and BNP with CP—we
learned that Canadian and Japanese samples do seem to differ signifi‐
cantly, even though a majority in both samples have—137 Canadian out
of 236  (\approx 58.1%  ) and 125 Japanese out of 234  (\approx 53.4%  ) samples re‐
sponded with clear and overwhelming importance of integrity shown in
Figures 1 and 2. It should be noted that BNP with CP clustering tends
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Figure 5: Four dimensional “jittered”scatterplot of (Ability, Benevolence, Integrity) for
trustworthy person in Canadian and Japanese samples combined with “Other”represented
by a colored vertical bar to the right according to the #2 of 7 clusters by CRP mixture
BNP clustering with with  \alpha=0.3.
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to produce many small clusters regardless of whether they are needed to
accurately characterize the data. Interpretability, parsimony, data storage
and communication costs all are hampered by having overly many clusters,
however. See, for instance, Lu et al. (2018) (  [Lu et al., 2018]).
If one is asked if the proportion of Japanese respondents who think
integrity is the only characteristic that matters for trustworthiness dif‐
ferent from the corresponding proportion of Canadian respondents, we
have  (0.534-0.581)/\sqrt{0581(1-0581)}/236\approx −0.04632/0.03212, which is
about 1.44 via the normal approximation of the binomial distribution. The
answer is clearly no and we cannot reject the hypothesis that “about the
same proportion of individuals in Canadian as well as Japanese culture will
hold the integrity to be the dominant components in the ABI framework.
Since we are ready to accept that individuals will vary in the extent to
which they are good cultural representatives and consider trustworthiness
in the mandated way within a given culture, however, we need to find out
where the differences come from between these two samples.
For many applications involving compositional data, it is necessary to
establish a valid measure of distance, yet when essential zeros are present
traditional distance measures for compositional data are problematic. Re‐
cently Stewart (2017) ([Stewart, eros]) compared measures of distance for
compositional data capable of handling zeros, but not satisfying some of
the well‐accepted principles of compositional data analysis. She found that
the chi‐square (CS) measure of distance between  x=(x_{1}, x_{2}, \ldots, x_{D}) and
 y=(y_{1}, y_{2}, \ldots, y_{D}) with  D component as










allows for essential zeros, and scale and permutation invariant, though
not subcompositionally dominant, but the last property may be ap‐
proximately satisfied through simulation studies. We may wish to inves‐
tigate the possibility of employing this distance measure for comparing
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